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Data of framed public good experiment on community Dam maintenance

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Title Data of framed public good experiment on community Dam maintenance
 
Identifier https://doi.org/10.21421/D2/MFT8ZD
 
Creator Thomas Falk
Shalander Kumar
Srinivasa Srigiri
 
Publisher ICRISAT Dataverse
 
Description In this study we explored how experimental games closely framed to local conditions can help to develop institutional capacity related to managing small village reservoirs in Rajasthan/India. We played artefactual public good experiments with 300 community leaders and combined the games with discussions. Research was carried out in 2016 the Bhilwara district in south-eastern Rajasthan/ India. The district is situated in the Sub Humid Southern Plain agro climatic zone of Rajasthan state. The average rainfall is above 650 mm. We replicated the dam management challenges of Rajasthan farmers in a simplified manner using a framed public good experiments. We decided to focus on the provisioning actions situation on the basis of stakeholder consultations. We used a non-linear pay-off function similar to the one in the Irrigation Games of Cardenas et al. (2008) and Janssen et al. (2011). Pay-offs were adjusted to estimates of average maintenance costs of dams as well typical income derived from dam water based on evaluations done by Singh et al. (2014). At the start of each round, participants were provided with the same initial endowment of 5000 Play Rupees. All participants decided simultaneously on the amount each one wanted to invest in maintaining the dam. Decision cards were used for this purpose. The accumulated individual contributions determine the group earning as by an S-shaped pay-off function which was presented throughout the game as a poster. The group earning was distributed equally amongst the players. Total earnings for an individual in a round were determined by this share of the group earnings from the dam, plus the amount of the initial endowment not invested. Participants were given US$ 1.10 as a show-up fee. The accumulated individual earnings were exchanged at the rate of approximately 0.015 US$ per 1000 Play Rupees. The exchange rate was adjusted to generate expected earnings equivalent to one day’s wages under the NREGA social employment scheme. Local field assistants were trained in facilitating the experiment. They explained the rules, conducted a quiz and test rounds, and recorded the decisions on computers. The games were structured in three phases. Firstly, five baseline rounds were played with private decisions and without any communication. After playing these five baseline rounds with anonymous decisions we introduce social information in terms of revealing the players’ decision from round six onwards. In this phase, contributions and earnings were written on an visible to all. After each round, players could at this stage also discuss after each round their experience in the game. The discussion was a critical element of our design as it allowed the players to start negotiations and propose rules. We recorded summaries of the discussions and counted all discussion input by content categories. After round ten, for each group a treatment was chosen by the facilitators based on the group specific content of discussions.



Protocol of the experiment




 
Subject Agricultural Sciences
Social Sciences
Water infrastructure management
Institutional capacity development
Experiments
India
 
Date 2016
 
Contributor Administrator
 
Type Experiment data
 
Source Survey