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Nash equilibria in fisher market

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Title Nash equilibria in fisher market
 
Creator ADSUL, B
BABU, CS
GARG, J
MEHTA, R
SOHONI, M
 
Description Much work has been done on the computation of market equilibria. However due to strategic play by buyers, it is not clear whether these are actually observed in the market. Motivated by the observation that a buyer may derive a better payoff by feigning a different utility function and thereby manipulating the Fisher market equilibrium, we formulate the Fisher market game in which buyers strategize by posing different utility functions. We show that existence of a conflict-free allocation is a necessary condition for the Nash equilibria (NE) and also sufficient for the symmetric NE in this game. There are many NE with very different payoffs, and the Fisher equilibrium payoff is captured at a symmetric NE. We provide a complete polyhedral characterization of all the NE for the two-buyer market game. Surprisingly, all the NE of this game turn out to be symmetric and the corresponding payoffs constitute a piecewise linear concave curve. We also study the correlated equilibria of this game and show that third-party mediation does not help to achieve a better payoff than NE payoffs.
 
Publisher SPRINGER-VERLAG BERLIN
 
Date 2011-10-24T02:57:51Z
2011-12-15T09:11:23Z
2011-10-24T02:57:51Z
2011-12-15T09:11:23Z
2010
 
Type Proceedings Paper
 
Identifier ALGORITHMIC GAME THEORY,6386,30-41
978-3-642-16169-8
0302-9743
http://dspace.library.iitb.ac.in/xmlui/handle/10054/15313
http://hdl.handle.net/100/2038
 
Source 3rd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory,Athens, GREECE,OCT 18-20, 2010
 
Language English