Evolutionary Stability Against Multiple Mutations
DSpace at IIT Bombay
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Title |
Evolutionary Stability Against Multiple Mutations
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Creator |
GHATAK, A
RAO, KSM SHAIJU, AJ |
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Subject |
Evolutionary game
ESS Strict Nash equilibrium Multiple mutations |
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Description |
It is known (see, e. g., Weibull in Evolutionary Game Theory, MIT Press, 1995) that an evolutionarily stable strategy is not necessarily robust against multiple mutations. Precise definition and analysis of "evolutionarily stable strategy against multiple mutations" are not available in the literature. In this article, we formalize evolutionarily robustness against multiple mutations. Our main result shows that such a robust strategy is necessarily a pure strategy. Further, we study some equivalent formulations and properties of evolutionary stability against multiple mutations. In particular, we characterize completely the robustness against multiple mutations in 2 x 2 games.
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Publisher |
SPRINGER BIRKHAUSER
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Date |
2014-10-16T13:44:08Z
2014-10-16T13:44:08Z 2012 |
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Type |
Article
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Identifier |
DYNAMIC GAMES AND APPLICATIONS, 2(4)376-384
2153-0785 2153-0793 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13235-012-0051-x http://dspace.library.iitb.ac.in/jspui/handle/100/15697 |
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Language |
en
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