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Evolutionary Stability Against Multiple Mutations

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Field Value
 
Title Evolutionary Stability Against Multiple Mutations
 
Creator GHATAK, A
RAO, KSM
SHAIJU, AJ
 
Subject Evolutionary game
ESS
Strict Nash equilibrium
Multiple mutations
 
Description It is known (see, e. g., Weibull in Evolutionary Game Theory, MIT Press, 1995) that an evolutionarily stable strategy is not necessarily robust against multiple mutations. Precise definition and analysis of "evolutionarily stable strategy against multiple mutations" are not available in the literature. In this article, we formalize evolutionarily robustness against multiple mutations. Our main result shows that such a robust strategy is necessarily a pure strategy. Further, we study some equivalent formulations and properties of evolutionary stability against multiple mutations. In particular, we characterize completely the robustness against multiple mutations in 2 x 2 games.
 
Publisher SPRINGER BIRKHAUSER
 
Date 2014-10-16T13:44:08Z
2014-10-16T13:44:08Z
2012
 
Type Article
 
Identifier DYNAMIC GAMES AND APPLICATIONS, 2(4)376-384
2153-0785
2153-0793
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13235-012-0051-x
http://dspace.library.iitb.ac.in/jspui/handle/100/15697
 
Language en