Record Details

Novel Mechanisms For Allocation Of Heterogeneous Items In Strategic Settings

Electronic Theses of Indian Institute of Science

View Archive Info
 
 
Field Value
 
Title Novel Mechanisms For Allocation Of Heterogeneous Items In Strategic Settings
 
Creator Prakash, Gujar Sujit
 
Subject Investments (Economics)- Allocation
Mechanism Design Theory
Heterogeneous Objects
Dynamic House Allocation
Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions
Optimal Combinatorial Auctions
Dynamic Matching
Multi-Armed Bandit Mechanisms
Two-Sided Markets
Financial Economics
 
Description Allocation of objects or resources to competing agents is a ubiquitous problem in the real world. For example, a federal government may wish to allocate different types of spectrum licenses to telecom service providers; a search engine has to assign different sponsored slots to the ads of advertisers; etc. The agents involved in such situations have private preferences over the allocations. The agents, being strategic, may manipulate the allocation procedure to get a favourable allocation. If the objects to be allocated are heterogeneous (rather than homogeneous), the problem becomes quite complex. The allocation problem becomes even more formidable in the presence of a dynamic supply and/or demand. This doctoral work is motivated by such problems involving strategic agents, heterogeneous objects, and dynamic supply and/or demand. In this thesis, we model such problems in a standard game theoretic setting and use mechanism design to propose novel solutions to the problems. We extend the current state-of-the-art in a non-trivial way by solving the following problems:
Optimal combinatorial auctions with single minded bidders, generalizing the existing methods to take into account multiple units of heterogeneous objects
Multi-armed bandit mechanisms for sponsored search auctions with multiple slots, generalizing the current methods that only consider a single slot.
Strategyproof redistribution mechanisms for heterogeneous objects, expanding the scope of the current state of practice beyond homogeneous objects
Online allocation mechanisms without money for one-sided and two-sided matching markets, extending the existing methods for static settings.
 
Contributor Narahari, Y
 
Date 2012-04-20T10:09:30Z
2012-04-20T10:09:30Z
2012-04-20
2010-10
 
Type Thesis
 
Identifier http://etd.iisc.ernet.in/handle/2005/1654
http://etd.ncsi.iisc.ernet.in/abstracts/2145/G24693-Abs-.pdf
 
Language en_US
 
Relation G24693