| Description |
How does a patron state dampen a client state’s domestic aspirations for developing nuclear weapons? What non-proliferation tools most effectively induce a client state’s domestic preference for nuclear forbearance? This article assesses the relative effectiveness of three non-proliferation tools available to a nuclear patron: a declaration of extended deterrence, forward deployment of nuclear weapons, and a conditional threat of punishment. More specifically, using experimental data on the South Korean public, this article examines whether nuclear forward-deployment and a conditional threat of punishment are more effective than a declaratory policy in enhancing the credibility of extended deterrence and curbing public aspirations for nuclearization. The experimental results show that neither nuclear forward-deployment nor a conditional threat of punishment reduces public support for nuclear armament significantly more than a declaratory policy. They also reveal that compared to when a nuclear ally does not exist, the three non-proliferation tools do not necessarily dampen the public’s preference for developing indigenous nuclear weapons. The robustness of the findings is assessed using an experiment on a small sample of government officials. Taken together, this study provides the first experimental evidence on public perception of different non-proliferation tools in a client state.
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