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Replication Data for: Household Bargaining and Excess Fertility: An Experimental Study in Zambia

Harvard Dataverse (Africa Rice Center, Bioversity International, CCAFS, CIAT, IFPRI, IRRI and WorldFish)

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Title Replication Data for: Household Bargaining and Excess Fertility: An Experimental Study in Zambia
 
Identifier https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/6MSJHK
 
Creator Ashraf, Nava
Field, Erica
Lee, Jean
 
Publisher Harvard Dataverse
 
Description We posit that household decision-making over fertility is characterized by moral hazard since most contraception can only be perfectly observed by the woman. Using an experiment in Zambia that varied whether women were given access to contraceptives alone or with their husbands, we find that women given access with their husbands were 19 percent less likely to seek family planning services, 25 percent less likely to use concealable contraception, and 27 percent more likely to give birth. However, women given access to contraception alone report a lower subjective well-being, suggesting a psycho-social cost of making contraceptives more concealable.
 
Subject Social Sciences
 
Contributor Parrado, Andres