Record Details

Referrals: Peer Screening and Enforcement in a Consumer Credit Field Experiment

Harvard Dataverse (Africa Rice Center, Bioversity International, CCAFS, CIAT, IFPRI, IRRI and WorldFish)

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Field Value
 
Title Referrals: Peer Screening and Enforcement in a Consumer Credit Field Experiment
 
Identifier https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/PBQE5A
 
Creator Bryan, Gharad
Karlan, Dean
Zinman, Jonathan
 
Publisher Harvard Dataverse
 
Description Empirical evidence on peer intermediation lags behind both theory and practice in which lenders use peers to mitigate adverse selection and moral hazard. Using a referral incentive under individual liability, we develop a two-stage field experiment that permits separate identification of peer screening and enforcement. Our key contribution is to allow for borrower heterogeneity in both ex ante repayment type and ex post susceptibility to social pressure. Our method allows identification of selection on repayment likelihood, selection on susceptibility to social pressure, and loan enforcement. Implementing our method in South Africa we find no evidence of screening but large enforcement effects.
 
Subject Social Sciences
Household Saving
Personal Finance
Asymmetric and Private Information
Mechanism Design
Banks
Depository Institutions
Micro Finance Institutions
Mortgages
Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
Economic Development: Financial Markets
Saving and Capital Investment
Corporate Finance and Governance
 
Language English
 
Contributor Research Support, Innovations for Poverty Action
 
Type Administrative data