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Replication Data for: Private Information and the Allocation of Land Use Subsidies in Malawi

Harvard Dataverse (Africa Rice Center, Bioversity International, CCAFS, CIAT, IFPRI, IRRI and WorldFish)

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Title Replication Data for: Private Information and the Allocation of Land Use Subsidies in Malawi
 
Identifier https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/SMU6PT
 
Creator Jack, Kelsey
 
Publisher Harvard Dataverse
 
Description Efficient targeting of public programs is difficult when the cost or benefit to potential recipients is private information. This study illustrates the potential of self-selection to improve allocational outcomes in the context of a program that subsidizes tree planting in Malawi. Landholders who received a tree planting contract as a result of bidding in an auction kept significantly more trees alive over a three year period than did landholders who received the contract through a lottery. The gains from targeting on private information through the auction represent a 30 percent cost savings per surviving tree for the implementing organization.
 
Subject Social Sciences
 
Contributor Parrado, Andres