Record Details

Replication Data for: What Does Reputation Buy? Differentiation in a Market for Third-Party Auditors

Harvard Dataverse (Africa Rice Center, Bioversity International, CCAFS, CIAT, IFPRI, IRRI and WorldFish)

View Archive Info
 
 
Field Value
 
Title Replication Data for: What Does Reputation Buy? Differentiation in a Market for Third-Party Auditors
 
Identifier https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/T6HEYF
 
Creator Duflo, Esther
Greenstone, Michael
Pande, Rohini
Ryan, Nicholas
 
Publisher Harvard Dataverse
 
Description We study differences in quality in the market for third-party environmental auditors in Gujarat, India. We find that, despite the low overall quality, auditors are heterogeneous and some perform well. We posit that these high-quality auditors survive by using their good name to insulate select client plants from regulatory scrutiny. We find two pieces of evidence broadly consistent with this hypothesis: (i) though estimates are not precise, higher-quality auditors appear to be paid more both in their work as third-party auditors and in their complementary work as consultants; and (ii) plants with high-quality auditors incur fewer costly penalties from the regulator.
 
Subject Social Sciences
 
Contributor Parrado, Andres