Record Details


Field	Value

Title	Replication data for: Dissolution Threats and Legislative Bargaining

Identifier	https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/26461

Creator	Becher, Michael Christiansen, Flemming Juul

Publisher	Harvard Dataverse

Description	Chief executives in many parliamentary democracies have the power to dissolve the legislature. Despite a well-developed literature on the endogenous timing of parliamentary elections, political scientists know remarkably little about the strategic use of dissolution power to influence policy-making. To address this gap, we propose and empirically evaluate a theoretical model of legislative bargaining in the shadow of executive dissolution power. The model implies that the chief executive's public support and legislative strength as well as the time until the next constitutionally mandated election are important determinants of the use and effectiveness of dissolution threats in policy-making. Analyzing an original times-series data set from a multi-party parliamentary democracy, we find evidence in line with key empirical implications of the model.

Subject	Social Sciences Legislative politics Coalition government Confidence voting Legislative veto Dissolution of legislative bodies Executive-legislative relations Parliaments

Contributor	Michael Becher

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