The Political Economy of Bad Data: Evidence from African Survey and Administrative Statistics
Harvard Dataverse (Africa Rice Center, Bioversity International, CCAFS, CIAT, IFPRI, IRRI and WorldFish)
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Title |
The Political Economy of Bad Data: Evidence from African Survey and Administrative Statistics
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Identifier |
https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/26712
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Creator |
Sandefur, Justin
Glassman, Amanda |
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Publisher |
Harvard Dataverse
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Description |
Across multiple African countries, discrepancies between administrative data and independent household surveys suggest official statistics systematically exaggerate development progress. We provide evidence for two distinct explanations of these discrepancies. First, governments misreport to foreign donors, as in the case of a results-based aid program rewarding reported vaccination rates. Second, national governments are themselves misled by frontline service providers, as in the case of primary education, where official enrollment numbers diverged from survey estimates after funding shifted from user fees to per pupil government grants. Both syndromes highlight the need for incentive compatibility between data systems and funding rules.
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Subject |
national statistics systems
Africa household surveys immunization |
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Date |
2014-07
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