Record Details


Field	Value

Title	Replication data for: Border Settlement, Commitment Problems and the Causes of Contiguous Rivalry

Identifier	https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/28519

Creator	Rider, Toby J. Owsiak, Andrew P.

Publisher	Harvard Dataverse

Description	Many studies have examined the formation of interstate rivalries, but few provide a theoretical mechanism capable of explaining why some neighboring states experience protracted conflict while others do not. To address this question, we theoretically link bargaining theories of conflict with issue-based explanations of conflict to offer a novel application of the commitment problem mechanism. We argue that when neighboring states disagree over border territory endowed with a potential source of power (i.e., strategic or economic value), it is difficult for either side to commit credibly in the future to comply with agreements made today. Consequently, neighboring states may be reluctant to make concessions that could enhance their adversary's future bargaining power. This reluctance, in turn, increases the likelihood of bargaining failure, thereby also increasing the likelihood that the dispute festers and the relationship evolves into a rivalry. Using recently reported data on border settlement and three mea

Subject	Social Sciences rivalry borders international conflict

Date	2015

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