ICAR Research Data Repository for Knowledge Management
Replication data for: Moral Hazard in Health Insurance: Do Dynamic Incentives Matter?
Harvard Dataverse (Africa Rice Center, Bioversity International, CCAFS, CIAT, IFPRI, IRRI and WorldFish)
View Archive Info| Field | Value | |
| Title |
Replication data for: Moral Hazard in Health Insurance: Do Dynamic Incentives Matter?
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| Identifier |
https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/28522
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| Creator |
Finkelstein, Amy
Einav, Liran Cullen, Mark Aron-Dine, Aviva |
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| Publisher |
Harvard Dataverse
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| Description |
Aron-Dine, Aviva, Einay, Liran, Finkelstein, Amy, and Cullen, Mark, (2015) "Moral Hazard in Health Insurance: Do Dynamic Incentives Matter?" Review of Economics and Statistics 97:4, 725-742.
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| Subject |
Social Sciences
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