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Replication data for: Conflict Resolution Mechanisms and Maritime Boundary Settlements

Harvard Dataverse (Africa Rice Center, Bioversity International, CCAFS, CIAT, IFPRI, IRRI and WorldFish)

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Title Replication data for: Conflict Resolution Mechanisms and Maritime Boundary Settlements
 
Identifier https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/28642
 
Creator Asgeirsdottir, Aslaug
Steinwand, Martin
 
Publisher Harvard Dataverse
 
Description This paper extends the literature on the institutionalization of international cooperation to the Law of the Sea, by focusing on 186 bilateral agreements that settle joint maritime boundaries, necessitated by the creation of the 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone with the 1982 Law of the Sea Treaty. About half of these agreements include mentions of Conflict Resolution Mechanisms (CRMs), one measure of institutionalization, but interestingly the vast majority of those specify bilateral negotiations as only venue for settling conflict. Our key finding is that states pay attention to the cost and flexibility of conflict resolutions mechanisms. Poorer states are more likely than wealthy states to specify bilateral negotiations, the cheapest and most flexible conflict resolution mechanism, as are governments negotiating on behalf of a dependency. Wealth differentials are also associated with demands for flexibility.