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Replication data for: A Political Economy of Income Tax Policies

Harvard Dataverse (Africa Rice Center, Bioversity International, CCAFS, CIAT, IFPRI, IRRI and WorldFish)

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Title Replication data for: A Political Economy of Income Tax Policies
 
Identifier https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/29631
 
Creator Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce
Downs, George
Smith, Alastair
 
Publisher Harvard Dataverse
 
Description Despite the close ties between tax-generated revenue and government policies, little is known about how political institutions shape the structure of tax choices across income levels. We propose and test a model based on the selectorate perspective which predicts that leader choices regarding taxing and spending are driven by their desire to maximize their survival prospects against domestic challengers. The empirical tests investigate the conditions under which income taxes are non-existent, flat, more regressive or more progressive and the degree of heterogeneity in tax systems as a function of governance institutions. The empirical results strongly and robustly support the theoretical predictions while also shedding light on how tax structures implemented in large coalition systems reduce income inequality.
 
Date 2015