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Replication Data for: Divergent Incentives for Dictators: Domestic Institutions and (International Promises Not to) Torture.

Harvard Dataverse (Africa Rice Center, Bioversity International, CCAFS, CIAT, IFPRI, IRRI and WorldFish)

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Title Replication Data for: Divergent Incentives for Dictators: Domestic Institutions and (International Promises Not to) Torture.
 
Identifier https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/30NKKQ
 
Creator Conrad, Courtenay
 
Publisher Harvard Dataverse
 
Description Divergent Incentives for Dictators: Domestic Institutions and (International Promises Not to) Torture. 2014. Journal of Conflict Resolution 58(1):34-67.
 
Subject Social Sciences
 
Contributor Conrad, Courtenay