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Replication data for: Quick Victories? Territory, Democracies, and Their Disputes. Journal of Conflict Resolution. 2013

Harvard Dataverse (Africa Rice Center, Bioversity International, CCAFS, CIAT, IFPRI, IRRI and WorldFish)

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Title Replication data for: Quick Victories? Territory, Democracies, and Their Disputes. Journal of Conflict Resolution. 2013
 
Identifier https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/4IBTN3
 
Creator Gibler, Douglas M.
Miller, Steven
 
Publisher Harvard Dataverse
 
Description Abstract: Recent scholarship suggests that democracies tend to fight shorter conflicts that can be easily won. This is most likely due to the accountability incentives that constrain democratic leaders. Fearing removal from office, democratic leaders will try to choose short conflicts against weaker opponents. The authors question this argument by presenting an alternative explanation for the connection between democracy and shorter disputes and victories. Building on prior works that have identified a territorial peace, this article argues that democracies often have few territorial issues over which to contend. In fact, rarely do democracies have territorial disputes with their neighbors. Thus, democracies have less difficult issues to resolve, and this makes conflict escalation less likely against neighbors. Without neighbors ready to attack the homeland, states at territorial peace can more easily choose favorable conflicts to escalate. This logic applies to all states at territorial peace, of which democratic states are just a subset. Analyses of directed-dispute dyads between 1816 and 2001 provide confirmation for our argument. Regime type does not predict conflict selection or victory once controls are added for issue salience.
 
Subject Democratic Selection
 
Date 2013
 
Type cross sectional time series