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Replication Data for: Motivated Corporate Political Action: Evidence from an SEC Experiment

Harvard Dataverse (Africa Rice Center, Bioversity International, CCAFS, CIAT, IFPRI, IRRI and WorldFish)

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Title Replication Data for: Motivated Corporate Political Action: Evidence from an SEC Experiment
 
Identifier https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/A4UV9D
 
Creator Mary A. Kroeger
Maria Silfa
 
Publisher Harvard Dataverse
 
Description Do bureaucratic actions trigger political engagement by firms? From 2005 through 2007, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) conducted a pilot study, for which they exempted a third of the stocks in the Russell 3000 Index from short-selling price restrictions. This case presents a unique opportunity to study the connection between governmental regulation and firms’ costly political engagement in an experimentally-manipulated setting. Using a difference-in-differences design, we find that firms exempted from price restrictions on short selling are more likely to lobby than the rest of the firms in the pilot study. In contrast, there is no discernible effect on treated firms' PAC contribution patterns. This study helps clarify the strategic motivations behind why firms differentially engage in political activity.
 
Subject Social Sciences
American institutions
Lobbying
Bureaucracy
Corporate political action
 
Contributor Kroeger, Mary