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Replication Data for: Accountability for Court Packing

Harvard Dataverse (Africa Rice Center, Bioversity International, CCAFS, CIAT, IFPRI, IRRI and WorldFish)

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Title Replication Data for: Accountability for Court Packing
 
Identifier https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/F5LLOQ
 
Creator Nelson, Michael
Driscoll, Amanda
 
Publisher Harvard Dataverse
 
Description How does the public respond to court packing attempts? Longstanding accounts of public support for courts suggest voters retaliate against incumbents who seek to manipulate well-respected courts. Yet incumbents might strategically frame their efforts in bureaucratic terms to minimize the public's outcry or use court packing proposals to activate a partisan base of support. Drawing on a series of survey experiments, we demonstrate that strategic politicians can minimize electoral backlash by couching court reform proposals in apolitical language, and institutional legitimacy's shielding effect dissolves in the face of shared partisanship. These results shed new light on how ambitious politicians might avoid electoral consequences for efforts to bend the judiciary to their will.
 
Subject Law
Social Sciences
court packing
legitimacy
judicial politics
court reform
 
Contributor Nelson, Michael