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Replication Data for: Stimulated Political Decisions: Local Leadership Turnover and Firm Subsidies in China

Harvard Dataverse (Africa Rice Center, Bioversity International, CCAFS, CIAT, IFPRI, IRRI and WorldFish)

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Title Replication Data for: Stimulated Political Decisions: Local Leadership Turnover and Firm Subsidies in China
 
Identifier https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/YOGI36
 
Creator Hou, Yue
Li, Siyao
 
Publisher Harvard Dataverse
 
Description How do politicians distribute government resources in regimes with no electoral considerations? We propose that new politicians minimize political risks by favoring politically important actors: state-owned enterprises (SOEs), but they adjust their behavior as they establish personal ties with private businesses. Using firm-level subsidies data after the 2008 stimulus in China, we find that new provincial governors, immediately after taking office, distribute a significantly larger proportion of subsidies to SOEs relative to private firms. The effect attenuates as new governors learn about local conditions and establish connections with private firms. We find suggestive evidence that governors who adopt such a strategy are more likely to be promoted. Contrary to conventional wisdom that the state always favors state-owned firms, we show that SOEs benefit from the stimulus package only in the short-run.
 
Subject Social Sciences
 
Contributor Li, Siyao