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Replication Data for: Top-Down or Bottom-Up? The Selection of Shadow Rapporteurs in the European Parliament

Harvard Dataverse (Africa Rice Center, Bioversity International, CCAFS, CIAT, IFPRI, IRRI and WorldFish)

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Title Replication Data for: Top-Down or Bottom-Up? The Selection of Shadow Rapporteurs in the European Parliament
 
Identifier https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/V907NM
 
Creator Häge, Frank M.
 
Publisher Harvard Dataverse
 
Description Shadow rapporteurs play an important role in developing the European Parliament’s collective policy positions and in defending them in inter-institutional negotiations. This study sheds light on the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of shadow rapporteur selection. Qualitative insights from practitioner interviews and a quantitative analysis of shadow rapporteur data from the 7th European Parliament (2009–2014) indicate that the appointment process is primarily one of bottom-up self-selection by group members based on their policy interests. The party group leadership, in the form of group coordinators, plays an important coordinating role when there is competition for a shadow rapporteurship. However, the role of group coordinators is more akin to a third-party arbiter of competing demands than a mechanism of top-down control by the leadership, as suggested by principal-agent theory.
 
Subject Social Sciences
Delegation, European Parliament, principal-agent theory, self-selection, shadow rapporteurs
 
Contributor Häge, Frank M.