ICAR Research Data Repository for Knowledge Management
Replication Data for: Mimica, N., & Navia, P. (2022). Militancia partidista e incentivos individuales: la membresía en comisiones permanentes en la Cámara de Diputados de Chile, 1990-2018. Revista De Ciencia Política. https://doi.org/10.4067/s0718-090x2022005000107
Harvard Dataverse (Africa Rice Center, Bioversity International, CCAFS, CIAT, IFPRI, IRRI and WorldFish)
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| Title |
Replication Data for: Mimica, N., & Navia, P. (2022). Militancia partidista e incentivos individuales: la membresía en comisiones permanentes en la Cámara de Diputados de Chile, 1990-2018. Revista De Ciencia Política. https://doi.org/10.4067/s0718-090x2022005000107
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| Identifier |
https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/D24AQC
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| Creator |
Navia, Patricio D
Mimica, Nicolás |
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| Publisher |
Harvard Dataverse
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| Description |
Party affiliationand individualincentives: committee assignmentsinthechamberof dePutiesin chile, 1990-2018 Militancia partidista e incentivos individuales: la membresía en comisiones permanentes en la Cámara de Diputados de Chile, 1990-2018 https://doi.org/10.4067/s0718-090x2022005000107 NICOLÁS MIMICA Universidad Diego Portales, Chile PATRICIO NAVIA Universidad Diego Portales, Chile & New York University, United States ABSTRACT In presidential democracies with strong party systems, the congress shares legis-lative powers with the executive, and parties strongly influence the behavior of legislators. The law-making process should reflect that balance of power, as the reactive legislative powers of Congress should make committee membership less valuable than in systems where the legislature enjoys proactive powers. The strong party system and electoral rules should also be reflected in committee assignment dynamics. We test 4 hypotheses on the impact of individual (distributional and in-formational theories) and party level incentives (cartel party and issue ownership theories) on annual committee membership in the Chamber of Deputies in Chile (1990-2018). District and legislator specific characteristics—like the economic acti-vity in the district and the legislator’s professional expertise, respectively—explain committee membership. In some policy dimensions, parties that exercise issue ow-nership also have more presence in the respective committees. Keywords: Legislative committee assignments; distributional theory; informational theory; cartel party theory; issue ownership theory; Chile. Acknowledgements: Both authors acknowledge funding from the National Fund for Scien-tific and Technological Development (Grant # 1200317) and by the Millenium Nucleus Cen-ter for the Study of Politics, Public Opinion and Media in Chile: [Grant Number NCS2021_063].Replicability: Ahead of PrintISSN: 0718-090XRevista de Ciencia Políticacienciapolitica.uc.cl |
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| Subject |
Social Sciences
Legislative committee assignments Distributional theory Informational theory Cartel party theory Issue ownership theory Chile |
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| Contributor |
Navia, Patricio D
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