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Replication Data for: Bodea, Cristina and Ana Carolina Garriga. 2022. "Central bank independence in Latin America: Politicization and de-delegation." Governance, forthcoming

Harvard Dataverse (Africa Rice Center, Bioversity International, CCAFS, CIAT, IFPRI, IRRI and WorldFish)

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Title Replication Data for: Bodea, Cristina and Ana Carolina Garriga. 2022. "Central bank independence in Latin America: Politicization and de-delegation." Governance, forthcoming
 
Identifier https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/5KCCQF
 
Creator Garriga, Ana Carolina
 
Publisher Harvard Dataverse
 
Description Data on central bank independence, central bank reforms (from Garriga 2016, updated), turnover of central bank governors (Dreher, Sturm, and de Haan 2008).

Users of the data should cite the original sources of data (Dreher, Sturm, and de Haan 2008 and/or Garriga 2016), and Bodea and Garriga 2022.

BBodea, Cristina and Ana Carolina Garriga. 2022. "Central bank independence in Latin America: Politicization and de-delegation." Governance. doi:10.1111/gove.12706

Dreher, Axel, Jan-Egbert Sturm, and Jakob de Haan. 2008. “Does High Inflation Cause Central Bankers to Lose Their Job? Evidence Based on A New Data Set.” European Journal of Political Economy 24(4): 778–787.

Garriga, Ana Carolina. 2016. “Central Bank Independence in the World: A New Data Set.” International Interactions 42(5): 849–868.
 
Subject Social Sciences
central bank independence
delegation
de-delegation
Latin America
 
Language English
 
Contributor Garriga, Ana Carolina