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Replication Data for: Modeling the Institutional Foundations of Parliamentary Government Formation

Harvard Dataverse (Africa Rice Center, Bioversity International, CCAFS, CIAT, IFPRI, IRRI and WorldFish)

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Title Replication Data for: Modeling the Institutional Foundations of Parliamentary Government Formation
 
Identifier https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/KIFRVV
 
Creator Golder, Sona
Golder, Matt
Siegel, David A.
 
Publisher Harvard Dataverse
 
Description That neither the assumptions nor the predictions of standard government formation models entirely correspond to empirical findings has led some to conclude that theoretical accounts of government formation should be reconsidered from the bottom up. We take up this challenge by presenting a zero-intelligence model of government formation. In our model, three or more parties that care about office and policy make random government proposals. The only constraints that we impose on government formation correspond to the two binding constitutional constraints that exist in all parliamentary systems: an incumbent government always exists and all governments must enjoy majority legislative support. Despite its deliberately limited structure, our model predicts distributions over portfolio allocation, government types, and bargaining delays that approach those observed in the real world. Our analysis suggests that many formation outcomes may result from the institutional foundation of parliamentary democracies, independent of the strategic behavior of party leaders.
 
Subject Social Sciences
 
Contributor Golder, Sona