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Replication Data for: When the Partisan Becomes Personal: Mayoral Incumbency Effects in Buenos Aires

Harvard Dataverse (Africa Rice Center, Bioversity International, CCAFS, CIAT, IFPRI, IRRI and WorldFish)

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Title Replication Data for: When the Partisan Becomes Personal: Mayoral Incumbency Effects in Buenos Aires
 
Identifier https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/S0BKP6
 
Creator Lucardi, Adrian
Feierherd, Germán
 
Publisher Harvard Dataverse
 
Description A burgeoning literature finds that incumbency effects reflect mostly a personal rather than a partisan advantage. We attribute this to incumbents’ mobilization incentives. Incumbents have weaker incentives to exert costly effort on behalf of their copartisans in national races than in local ones, where their local power is at stake. We examine these implications in the Province of Buenos Aires, Argentina’s largest subnational unit, where midterm elections give mayors a strong incentive to help their copartisans running for the local council, but much weaker ones to support those running for a national seat. Using a regression discontinuity design, we find a large positive effect of incumbency in local mayoral and midterm elections. In contrast, local incumbents neither help nor hurt their copartisans running for the presidency or the national legislature.
 
Subject Social Sciences
incumbency effects
regression discontinuity
Argentina
Buenos Aires
 
Contributor Lucardi, Adrian