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Replication Data for: Board on the Job: Public-Pension Governance in the U.S. States

Harvard Dataverse (Africa Rice Center, Bioversity International, CCAFS, CIAT, IFPRI, IRRI and WorldFish)

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Title Replication Data for: Board on the Job: Public-Pension Governance in the U.S. States
 
Identifier https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/1CCXS9
 
Creator Brooks, John
 
Publisher Harvard Dataverse
 
Description Though elected officials have the final say over pensions, boards of trustees also influence plan governance. Not a great deal is known about boards or how they shape policies. Boards are composed of politically and non-politically appointed members, as well as active and retired employees. Plan active-employee size turns out to be the best predictor of membership, suggesting that employee voice expands as plans cover more workers. Using both fixed effects and instrumental variables approaches, I show how boards shape plans' policies and funded levels. Active and retired members shape discount rates, while active membership is positively associated with funded ratios. Interestingly, political gridlock is also associated with higher discount rates. However, I find that plans' actual investment returns are poor predictors of expected returns, irrespective of board composition. While boards offer a venue through which states can manage funds, they are not suited to solving pensions' governance challenges alone.
 
Subject Social Sciences
pension, states, bureaucracy
 
Contributor Brooks, John