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Replication Data for: A New Moral Hazard? Military Intervention, Peacekeeping and Ratification of the International Criminal Court, Journal of Peace Research, 46 (5), 2009, pp. 659-670

Harvard Dataverse (Africa Rice Center, Bioversity International, CCAFS, CIAT, IFPRI, IRRI and WorldFish)

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Title Replication Data for: A New Moral Hazard? Military Intervention, Peacekeeping and Ratification of the International Criminal Court, Journal of Peace Research, 46 (5), 2009, pp. 659-670
 
Identifier https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/6A3GDA
 
Creator Neumayer, Eric
 
Publisher Harvard Dataverse
 
Description The newly established International Criminal Court (ICC) promises justice to the victims of genocide,
war crimes and crimes against humanity. Past offenders can be punished, while future potential offenders
may be deterred by the prospect of punishment. Yet, justice is no substitute for intervention for
the benefit of people at acute risk of being victimized. The Court may create a new moral hazard
problem if the promise of ex post justice makes it easier for states to shy away from incurring the costs
of intervention. This article indirectly tests for the relevance of this potential problem by estimating
the determinants of ratification delay to the Rome Statute of the ICC. If the Court represents an
excuse for inaction, then countries that are unwilling or unable to intervene in foreign conflicts should
be among its prime supporters. Results show instead that countries that in the past have been more
willing to intervene in foreign civil wars and more willing to contribute troops to multinational peacekeeping
missions are more likely to have ratified the Statute (early on). This suggests that the Court is a
complement to, not a substitute for intervention
 
Subject Social Sciences
 
Contributor Neumayer, Eric