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Replication Data for: Transparency, Protest and Democratic Stability

Harvard Dataverse (Africa Rice Center, Bioversity International, CCAFS, CIAT, IFPRI, IRRI and WorldFish)

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Title Replication Data for: Transparency, Protest and Democratic Stability
 
Identifier https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/85X0HW
 
Creator Hollyer, James
Rosendorff, B. Peter
Vreeland, James Raymond
 
Publisher Harvard Dataverse
 
Description Democratic rule is maintained so long as all relevant actors in the political system comply with the institutional rules of the game -- democratic institutions must be self-enforcing. We examine the role of transparency in supporting a democratic equilibrium. Transparency improves the functioning of elections: in transparent polities, elections more effectively resolve adverse selection problems between the public and their rulers. Transparency increases popular satisfaction with democracy and inhibits challenges to the democratic order. We provide a game-theoretic model, test these claims, and find they enjoy empirical support. Transparency is associated with a reduction in both the probability of democratic collapse and of the irregular removal of democratic leaders. Transparency stabilizes democratic rule.
 
Subject Social Sciences
 
Contributor Hollyer, James