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Replication Data for: Are Stricter Investment Rules Contagious? Host Country Competition for Foreign Direct Investment through International Agreements (with Peter Nunnenkamp and Martin Roy), Review of World Economics 152, 2016, pp. 177-213

Harvard Dataverse (Africa Rice Center, Bioversity International, CCAFS, CIAT, IFPRI, IRRI and WorldFish)

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Title Replication Data for: Are Stricter Investment Rules Contagious? Host Country Competition for Foreign Direct Investment through International Agreements (with Peter Nunnenkamp and Martin Roy), Review of World Economics 152, 2016, pp. 177-213
 
Identifier https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/AUEJI6
 
Creator Neumayer, Eric
 
Publisher Harvard Dataverse
 
Description We argue that competitive diffusion is a driver of the trend toward
international investment agreements with stricter investment rules, namely defensive
moves of developing countries concerned about foreign direct investment (FDI)
diversion in favor of competing host countries. Accounting for spatial dependence
in the formation of bilateral investment treaties and preferential trade agreements
that contain investment provisions, we find that the increase in agreements with
stricter provisions on investor-to-state dispute settlement and pre-establishment
national treatment is a contagious process. Specifically, a developing country is
more likely to sign an agreement with weak investment provisions if other developing
countries that compete for FDI from the same developed country have previously
signed agreements with similarly weak provisions. Conversely, contagion in
agreements with strong provisions exclusively derives from agreements with strong
provisions that other FDI-competing developing countries have previously signed
with a specific developed source country of FDI.
 
Subject Social Sciences
Bilateral investment treaties
Preferential trade agreements
Investment provisions
Competition for FDI
Spatial dependence
 
Contributor Neumayer, Eric