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Replication Data for: Investor Rights versus Human Rights: Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Tilt the Scale?

Harvard Dataverse (Africa Rice Center, Bioversity International, CCAFS, CIAT, IFPRI, IRRI and WorldFish)

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Title Replication Data for: Investor Rights versus Human Rights: Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Tilt the Scale?
 
Identifier https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/AVIA6Z
 
Creator Bodea, Cristina
Ye, Fangjin
 
Publisher Harvard Dataverse
 
Description We argue that the broad and legally enforceable protection offered to foreign investors by bilateral investment treaties (BITs) worsens the human rights practices of developing countries. BITs lock-in initial conditions attractive to investors that are linked to vertical investment flows and investment and trade competition. BITs also constrain the provision of welfare benefits or basic infrastructure. The lock-in and constraining effects are sources of popular grievance and dissent in states that host foreign investment. BIT protected investor rights, however, limit the ability of governments to back-down vis-à-vis investors, lowering the relative cost of human rights violations. Finally, we explain that democratic regimes mitigate the negative effect of BITs. Evidence from 113 developing countries from 1981 to 2009 supports our hypotheses.
 
Subject Social Sciences
Bilateral Investment Treaties
Human Rights
Democracy
 
Contributor Ye, Fangjin