Explaining Extremity in the Foreign Policies of Parliamentary Democracies
Harvard Dataverse (Africa Rice Center, Bioversity International, CCAFS, CIAT, IFPRI, IRRI and WorldFish)
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Title |
Explaining Extremity in the Foreign Policies of Parliamentary Democracies
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Identifier |
https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/C0GITL
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Creator |
Beasley, Ryan K.
Kaarbo, Juliet |
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Publisher |
Harvard Dataverse
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Description |
Why do multiparty cabinets in parliamentary democracies produce more extreme foreign policies than single-party cabinets? Our paper argues that particular institutional and psychological dynamics explain this difference. We test this argument using a global events data set incorporating foreign policy behaviors of numerous multiparty and single-party governments. We find that more parties and weak parliaments promote extremity in coalitions, but parliamentary strength has the opposite effect for single-party governments. This study challenges existing expectations about the impact of democratic institutions on foreign policy.
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Subject |
Social Sciences
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