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Replication Data for: K Street on Main: Legislative Turnover and Multi-client Lobbying

Harvard Dataverse (Africa Rice Center, Bioversity International, CCAFS, CIAT, IFPRI, IRRI and WorldFish)

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Title Replication Data for: K Street on Main: Legislative Turnover and Multi-client Lobbying
 
Identifier https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/84FBLB
 
Creator Strickland, James
Crosson, Jesse
 
Publisher Harvard Dataverse
 
Description This study explores the consequences of legislative turnover for the hiring of lobbyists and influence of interest groups. We argue that lobbyists develop durable relationships with lawmakers in assemblies with low turnover. Such relationships allow lobbyists to attract clients. We use a new, state-level measure of multi-client lobbying to show that legislative turnover and multi-client lobbying are inversely related: decreases in turnover are correlated with more multi-client lobbying. In a second set of analyses, we find that legislative term limits are associated with less multi-client lobbying. Since multi-client lobbying poses risks to the representation of individual interests and magnifies the effects of resource differences between interests, our results suggest that turnover may help more diverse interests to achieve political influence.
 
Subject Social Sciences
legislative turnover
lobbying
 
Contributor Strickland, James