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Replication Data for: Angling for Influence: Institutional Proliferation in Development Banking

Harvard Dataverse (Africa Rice Center, Bioversity International, CCAFS, CIAT, IFPRI, IRRI and WorldFish)

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Title Replication Data for: Angling for Influence: Institutional Proliferation in Development Banking
 
Identifier https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/QNHR2D
 
Creator Pratt, Tyler
 
Publisher Harvard Dataverse
 
Description Why do states build new international organizations (IOs) in issue areas where many institutions already exist? Prevailing theories of institutional creation emphasize their ability to resolve market failures, but adding new IOs can increase uncertainty and rule inconsistency. I argue that institutional proliferation occurs when existing IOs fail to adapt to shifts in state power. Member states expect decision-making rules to reflect their underlying power; when it does not, they demand greater influence in the organization. Subsequent bargaining over the redistribution of IO influence often fails due to credibility and information problems. As a result, under-represented states construct new organizations that provide them with greater institutional control. To test this argument, I examine the proliferation of multilateral development banks since 1944. I leverage a novel identification strategy rooted in the allocation of World Bank votes at Bretton Woods to show that the probability of institutional proliferation is higher when power is misaligned in existing institutions. My results suggest that conflict over shifts in global power contribute to the fragmentation of global governance.
 
Subject Social Sciences
Its, Market Failure, Issues, State Power, Credibility, Information, Global Governance
 
Contributor Prins, Brandon