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Replication Data for: Are Courts Different?: Experimental Evidence on the Unique Costs of Attacking Courts

Harvard Dataverse (Africa Rice Center, Bioversity International, CCAFS, CIAT, IFPRI, IRRI and WorldFish)

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Title Replication Data for: Are Courts Different?: Experimental Evidence on the Unique Costs of Attacking Courts
 
Identifier https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/29CDEZ
 
Creator Nelson, Michael
Driscoll, Amanda
 
Publisher Harvard Dataverse
 
Description U.S. courts have long been thought to be held in special regard by the American public, and public support is theorized to protect institutions from interbranch aggression. At the same time, recent research underscores that institutional fealty and public reaction to court curbing is shaped by partisan concerns. Drawing on a survey experiment fielded in the U.S., we evaluate whether (1) the public is uniquely punitive toward incumbents who seek to undermine a court rather than an agency and (2) the extent to which these penalties are dependent upon shared partisanship with the proposer. We are the first to demonstrate that the public is less supportive of efforts to strip judicial power than analogous efforts to strip power from an executive agency, but that this penalty for court curbing dissipates in the face of copartisanship. This substantiates previous claims regarding the role of partisanship on shaping public attitudes about high courts, but underscores that the American public may still hold the courts in unique regard, when contrasted to other political institutions.
 
Subject Law
Social Sciences
 
Date 2023-09-03
 
Contributor Nelson, Michael