Record Details


Field	Value

Title	Replication Data for: Banking Bad? A Global Field Experiment on Risk, Reward, and Regulation

Identifier	https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/VBNCF2

Creator	Findley, Michael Nielson, Daniel Sharman, J.C.

Publisher	Harvard Dataverse

Description	Are banks sensitive to risk and reward in following global corporate transparency rules? Using a worldwide field experiment, this study evaluates competing predictions from expected utility, behavioralist, and institutionalist accounts. We incorporated a dozen companies around the world to make over 15,000 email solicitations asking for corporate accounts from 5,000 of the world’s internationally connected banks. Treatments randomize the risk profiles of different companies – by their countries’ association with corruption, terrorism, and tax evasion – and vary rewards by stating differing amounts of business revenues. The outcomes are the rates at which banks offer accounts and comply with rules on customer identification. The results suggest that banks are moderately responsive to risk – though not reward – but the magnitude of the effects is small, providing mixed evidence for conventional models and suggestive support for institutionalist accounts.

Subject	Social Sciences Field experiment Banks Anti-money laundering Organizational scripts

Date	2024-01-16

Contributor	Findley, Michael

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