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The Colombian Paradox: Peace Processes, Elite Divisions & Popular Plebiscites (Online Appendix)

Harvard Dataverse (Africa Rice Center, Bioversity International, CCAFS, CIAT, IFPRI, IRRI and WorldFish)

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Title The Colombian Paradox: Peace Processes, Elite Divisions & Popular Plebiscites (Online Appendix)
 
Identifier https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/DUM2HH
 
Creator Matanock, Aila
García-Sánchez, Miguel
 
Publisher Harvard Dataverse
 
Description "Ending civil conflict is difficult, particularly through political settlements. Conflicts now often occur in states with elections, and voters have sometimes been directly involved in the process, potentially in efforts to overcome elite divisions. Yet, according to evidence from the 2016 popular plebiscite in Colombia, referendums and other tools of direct approval by voters seem to amplify elite divisions and therefore are not a useful mechanism to strengthen peace processes in this way. Focusing instead on traditional elite-led negotiations that seek to satisfy each faction may have a better chance of producing signed settlements, although the Colombian case also suggests some alternative forms of inclusivity that may help increase the overall legitimacy of the process and improve the odds of implementation."
 
Subject Social Sciences
Colombia
peace process
public opinion
concessions
elite cues
popular plebiscite
 
Contributor Matanock, Aila