Record Details

Replication Data for: Kyoto Protocol Cooperation: Does Government Corruption Facilitate Environmental Lobbying? (with Per G. Fredriksson and Gergely Ujhelyi), Public Choice, 133 (1-2), 2007, pp. 231-251

Harvard Dataverse (Africa Rice Center, Bioversity International, CCAFS, CIAT, IFPRI, IRRI and WorldFish)

View Archive Info
 
 
Field Value
 
Title Replication Data for: Kyoto Protocol Cooperation: Does Government Corruption Facilitate Environmental Lobbying? (with Per G. Fredriksson and Gergely Ujhelyi), Public Choice, 133 (1-2), 2007, pp. 231-251
 
Identifier https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/EXRZ9Y
 
Creator Neumayer, Eric
 
Publisher Harvard Dataverse
 
Description Does environmental lobbying affect the probability of environmental treaty ratification? Does the level of government corruption play a role for the success of such lobbying?
In this paper, we propose that a more corruptible government may be more responsive to the
demands of the environmental lobby. We use several stratified hazard models and panel data
from 170 countries on the timing of Kyoto Protocol ratification to test this hypothesis. We
find that increased environmental lobby group activity raises the probability of ratification,
and the effect rises with the degree of corruption.
 
Subject Social Sciences
corruption
political economy
agreements
ratification
environmentalism
 
Contributor Neumayer, Eric