Record Details


Field	Value

Title	Replication Data for Luck of the Draw? Members’ Bills & the Electoral Connection

Identifier	https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/EYVIDZ

Creator	Indridason, Indridi Williams, Brian

Publisher	Harvard Dataverse

Description	The legislative agenda in most parliamentary systems is controlled tightly by the government and bills offered by individual members of parliament have low rates of success. Yet, MPs do seek to present (private) members’ bills even where the rate of adoption is very low. We argue that members’ bills serve as an electoral connection but also as an opportunity for MPs to signal competence to their co-partisans. To demonstrate the presence of an electoral connection we take advantage of the random selection of private members’ bills in the New Zealand House of Representatives and show that survey respondents approve more of electorate MPs whose bills were drawn on the ballot. In addition, we show that MPs respond to the incentives created by the voters and parties’ willingness to reward legislative effort and, consequently, that electorally vulnerable legislators are more likely to place members’ bills on the ballot.

Subject	Social Sciences Private Member Bills

Contributor	Indridason, Indridi

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