Record Details

Replication Data for: Why Governments Cede Sovereignty: Evidence from Regional Human Rights Courts

Harvard Dataverse (Africa Rice Center, Bioversity International, CCAFS, CIAT, IFPRI, IRRI and WorldFish)

View Archive Info
 
 
Field Value
 
Title Replication Data for: Why Governments Cede Sovereignty: Evidence from Regional Human Rights Courts
 
Identifier https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/6M4LFJ
 
Creator Daniel Hill
 
Publisher Harvard Dataverse
 
Description This study examines a government's decision to cede authority over fundamental questions of policy to international organizations. Explanations for delegation to international institutions focus on the benefits of ``locking in'' domestic political institutions and signaling intentions to the public. This line of reasoning suggests that partly democratic and democratizing governments have the strongest incentive to
participate in international human rights institutions. I evaluate this claim by analyzing patterns of participation in two regional human rights courts: the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The decision to join a regional court is a more valid indicator of delegation than those used in previous
empirical studies, and to date has not been examined in systematic fashion. I find strong evidence in support of the claim that governments grant authority to
institutions to credibly commit to maintaining democracy.
 
Subject Social Sciences
 
Contributor Replication, FPA