ICAR Research Data Repository for Knowledge Management
Replication data for: A Dynamic Calculus of Voting
Harvard Dataverse (Africa Rice Center, Bioversity International, CCAFS, CIAT, IFPRI, IRRI and WorldFish)
View Archive Info| Field | Value | |
| Title |
Replication data for: A Dynamic Calculus of Voting
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| Identifier |
https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/AR8RLF
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| Creator |
James H. Fowler
Oleg Smirnov |
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| Publisher |
Harvard Dataverse
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| Description |
We construct a decision-theoretic model of turnout, in which individuals maximize their subjective expected utility in a context of repeated elections. In the model a nonnegative signaling motivation to vote exists for all citizens, regardless of their ideology or beliefs about the closeness of the election, and is proportional to a citizen's external efficacy, patience, and electoral pessimism. We find tentative support for all three effects in an empirical model of turnout using NES data (1976-1988). This paper suggests that the signaling motivation may play a role in a citizen’s decision to vote.
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| Subject |
turnout
voting elections signaling motivation external efficacy |
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| Date |
2007
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