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Replication data for: Contested control: Congress, the President, and the Pentagon

Harvard Dataverse (Africa Rice Center, Bioversity International, CCAFS, CIAT, IFPRI, IRRI and WorldFish)

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Title Replication data for: Contested control: Congress, the President, and the Pentagon
 
Identifier https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/CED9HK
 
Creator Byron Lowell Winn
 
Publisher Harvard Dataverse
 
Description Congress and the President, with conflicting policy interests rooted in different constituencies, contend for control of the bureaucracy. Control of the bureaucracy is central to control of policy.

Informed selection of personnel is a particularly efficient tool of bureaucratic control because it solves problems inherent in the principal-agent relationship--if the policy preferences of the agent match those of the principal, mechanisms of monitoring and control may be minimized. Seeki
ng enhanced bureaucratic control to enact his policy agenda, President Reagan extended use of the personnel tool, selecting more political appointees on the basis of their loyalty not (only) to him, but to his policy agenda.


Because of their known policy preferences and membership in the issue networks from which appointees are increasingly drawn, many of Reagan's appointees were former congressional staffers. As a result of their staff experience and the continuing political sponsorship of their legislative principals, such appointees tend to share the policy preferences of their legislative principals and are more likely to communicate more, and sincerely, with Capitol Hill. Increasing the number of su
ch appointees increases congressional influence over policy not only as a result of these shared policy preferences, but the relief of the information asymmetry which generally plagues control of bureaucracy. The effectiveness of the new tactic encouraged legislators to more forcefully support their own preferred candidates for presidential appointments, resulting in a more contentious appointments process, as well as more appointees with congressional staff experience.


Congress has traditionally deferred to the President in matters of defense policy. Yet the proportion of Defense Department political appointees with congressional staff experience increased from 8% in 1980 to 35% in 1992. This transformation coincided with substantial increases in the use of other tools of influence by Congress, as legislators became much more assertive in defense policy. Aided by the former staffers among appointees, Congress has moved beyond an occasional concern
with structural policy (such as the location of military bases) to routinely influence strategic policy (such as the organization, funding and use of Special Operations Forces). Legislators inject their policy concerns earlier and more extensively into the departmental policy process, biasing outcomes toward congressional preferences. Increased congressional influence comes at the expense of the President.
 
Subject Political Science
Public Administration
History
Political Appointees
Reagan Administration
 
Date 1996