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Choosing How to Cooperate: A Repeated Public-Goods Model of International Relations

Harvard Dataverse (Africa Rice Center, Bioversity International, CCAFS, CIAT, IFPRI, IRRI and WorldFish)

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Title Choosing How to Cooperate: A Repeated Public-Goods Model of International Relations
 
Identifier https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/DQ4SCA
 
Creator Randall W. Stone
Branislav L. Slantchev
Tamar R. London
 
Publisher Harvard Dataverse
 
Description International relations theory has borrowed important intuitions from Olson's static public-goods model (hegemonic stability) and the repeated prisoners' dilemma (theories of international cooperation), and arguments often combine implications from both models. We develop a general, repeated public-goods model. We then allow the qualitative dimensions of cooperation to emerge endogenously: agreements can have broad or narrow membership and entail deep or shallow commitments; they can be multilateral or discriminatory; they can be ad hoc or institutionalized. We find that the relationship between the distribution of power and international cooperation is complex: a large leading state forms a narrow coalition of intensive contributors, and builds institutions, while a smaller leading state forms a broader coalition that makes shallow contributions, and is more inclined to multilateralism.
 
Date 2008-02-11
 
Type Aptech Gauss programs for Monte Carlo simulations