Record Details


Field	Value

Title	Replication Data for: Constitutional Qualms or Politics as Usual? The Factors Shaping Public Support for Unilateral Action

Identifier	https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/DSDNX6

Creator	Kriner, Douglas Christenson, Dino

Publisher	Harvard Dataverse

Description	The formal institutional constraints that Congress and the courts impose on presidential unilateral action are feeble. As a result, recent scholarship suggests that public opinion may be the strongest check against executive overreach. However, little is known about how the public assesses unilateral action. Through a series of five survey experiments embedded on nationally representative surveys, we examine the extent to which Americans evaluate unilateral action based on constitutional, partisan, and policy concerns. We find that Americans do not instinctively reject unilateral action as a threat to our system of checks and balances, but instead evaluate unilateral action in terms of whether it accords or conflicts with their partisan and policy preference priors. Our results suggest that the public constraint on presidential unilateral action is far from automatic. Rather, the strength and scope of this check is a variable product of political contestation in the public sphere.

Subject	Social Sciences Presidents Unilateral acts Public opinion

Contributor	Kriner, Douglas

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