Record Details


Field	Value

Title	Replication data for: Developing Countries and GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement

Identifier	https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/DYDOIQ

Creator	Eric Reinhardt Marc Busch

Publisher	Harvard Dataverse

Description	It has long been observed that developing countries made scant use of dispute settlement under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Less clear are the reasons for this. Most observers insist that the various GATT reforms that were intended to help developing countries failed to insulate them from the “power politics” of the system (Kuruvila, 1997). Not surprisingly, many of these same observers predict that the greater “legalism” of the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), in particular, will encourage more participation by developing countries. Indeed, some go so far as to suggest that, enticed by a system in which, unlike in the GATT years, “right perseveres over might” (Lacarte-Muro and Gappah, 2000, 401), developing countries will have greater recourse to multilateral dispute settlement. The underlying presumption, of course, is that developing countries were especially ill-served by GATT’s diplomacy, and are better poised to benefit from the WTO’s more legalistic architecture. We argue that this conventional wisdom is wrong on both counts.

Date	2003

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