Replication Data for: Post-Grant Adjudication of Drug Patents: Agency and/or Court?
Harvard Dataverse (Africa Rice Center, Bioversity International, CCAFS, CIAT, IFPRI, IRRI and WorldFish)
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Title |
Replication Data for: Post-Grant Adjudication of Drug Patents: Agency and/or Court?
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Identifier |
https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/YCMKVU
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Creator |
Rai, Arti K.
Vishnubhakat, Saurabh Lemus, Jorge Hovenkamp, Erik |
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Publisher |
Harvard Dataverse
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Description |
The America Invents Act of 2011 (“AIA”) created a robust administrative system—the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”)—for challenging the validity of granted patents. Congress determined that administrative correction of errors made in initial patent grants could be cheaper and more scientifically accurate than district court litigation over patent validity. In terms of private economic value per patent, few areas of technology can match the biopharmaceutical industry. Particularly for small molecule drugs, a billion-dollar drug monopoly may be protected from competition by a relatively small number of patents. Accordingly, the social cost of invalid patents—and, by extension, the potential benefit of PTAB review—is particularly acute in the biopharmaceutical industry. Conversely, to the extent that PTAB is overly assertive and improperly targets high-quality patents, the decrease in innovation incentives may be quite problematic. To investigate the issue empirically, our paper uses a novel dataset (made publicly available via the publication of this article) to study the respective roles of the PTAB and the district courts |
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Subject |
Law
Medicine, Health and Life Sciences |
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Contributor |
Vishnubhakat, Saurabh
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