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Paper Abstract: In contrast to diplomatic and economic tools to prevent nuclear proliferation, fewer countries have openly admitted to using counter-proliferation force. Yet, several of these operations have been quietly unfolding behind the scenes. This paper introduces a novel, small-N Nuclear Counter-proliferation dataset (NCP) of preventive counter-proliferation attacks 1942-2023. It shows the distribution of these attacks over time and finds an overall increasing trend with assassinations being the most frequently used tool to interfere with a country’s nuclear ambitions, followed by airstrikes, sabotage, cyber weapons, and more recently drone strikes. The paper provides an empirical application of NCP, showing how the study of nuclear counter-proliferation can contribute to our understanding of the international behavior in response to selected military actions. The global response of such operations have largely been limited to verbal condemnation despite the reoccurring violations of international law. I find that a target’s silence is determining the international response to an attack which implies a pattern whereas the international community's response to violence is contingent upon external prompts.
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