ICAR Research Data Repository for Knowledge Management
Inefficient Water Pricing and Incentives for Conservation
OAR@ICRISAT
View Archive Info| Field | Value | |
| Relation |
http://oar.icrisat.org/12555/
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/app.20210011 https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20210011 |
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| Title |
Inefficient Water Pricing and Incentives for Conservation
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| Creator |
Chakravorty, U
Dar, M H Emerick, K |
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| Subject |
Water Resources
Water Conservation |
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| Description |
Farmers often buy water using fixed fees—rather than with marginal prices. We use two randomized controlled trials in Bangladesh to study the relationship between marginal prices, adoption of a water-saving technology, and water usage. Our first experiment shows that the technology only saves water when farmers face marginal prices. Our second experiment finds that an encouragement to voluntarily convert to hourly pumping charges does not save water. Taken together, efforts to conserve water work best when farmers face marginal prices, but simply giving an option for marginal pricing is insufficient to trigger water-saving investments and reduce irrigation demands.
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| Publisher |
American Economic Association
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| Date |
2023-01
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| Type |
Article
PeerReviewed |
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| Format |
application/pdf
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| Language |
en
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| Rights |
cc_attribution
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| Identifier |
http://oar.icrisat.org/12555/1/American%20Economic%20Journal_Applied%20Economics_15_1_319-350_2023.pdf
Chakravorty, U and Dar, M H and Emerick, K (2023) Inefficient Water Pricing and Incentives for Conservation. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 15 (1). pp. 319-350. ISSN 1945-7790 |
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