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What explains hegemonic governments’ behavior toward international orders they create? Canonical international relations research conceptualizes orders as systemic, long-term projects of hegemons. I instead argue that orders, once in place, provide valuable domestic political capital. Hegemonic leaders have stronger incentives to invest in hegemony when doing so potentially enhances their political legitimacy. Using a new dataset of over 8,000 Ming and Qing dynasty tribute exchanges between 1368 and 1895, I assess whether emperor legitimacy needs help explain China’s engagement in tribute diplomacy, a central institution of Chinese hegemony. The findings show that new emperors, particularly following “irregular” entry into power, invested heavily in tribute to pursue legitimacy among internal and external audiences. This behavior was most common with “high-value” counterparts. An illustrative case documents how the Yongle Emperor deployed tribute to legitimize his right to rule. The findings demonstrate the importance of domestic politics and leader legitimacy for understanding the nature and persistence of order in early modern Asia.
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