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Replication Data for: "Delegating legislative powers to the European Commission: The threat of non- compliance with tertiary legislation in the member states"

Harvard Dataverse (Africa Rice Center, Bioversity International, CCAFS, CIAT, IFPRI, IRRI and WorldFish)

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Title Replication Data for: "Delegating legislative powers to the European Commission: The threat of non- compliance with tertiary legislation in the member states"
 
Identifier https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/DOORVS
 
Creator Yordanova, Nikoleta
Zhelyazkova, Asya
 
Publisher Harvard Dataverse
 
Description When does delegation of legislative powers to the executive endanger policy compliance? The EU Lisbon Treaty introduced quasi-legislative tertiary legislation – delegated acts – which empower the European Commission to amend secondary legislation. Formally, member states control delegated acts only ex post via a veto power in the Council, while they have both ex ante amendment powers and ex post veto over the alternative Commission legislation: implementing acts. However, as member states determine the choice of legislative instrument, we argue that they would consent to the Commission adopting delegated acts only on non-controversial issues. Such selection should result in their lower compliance with implementing than delegated acts. Our analyses of member states’ transposition delays and infringement cases related to EU tertiary directives support this argument. The results suggest that the delegation of legislative powers to the executive does not increase non-compliance when the legislators have the means to moderate it ex ante.
 
Subject Law
Social Sciences
executive laws
policy compliance
EU Commission
comitology
EU member states
EU delegated acts
EU implementing acts
 
Date 2024-03-11
 
Contributor Zhelyazkova, Asya